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Abstract—The basis of generating secret key from the common
wireless channel at two communication parties is reciprocity.
However, due to non-simultaneous measurements and unavoid-
able estimation error, bias always exists and key disagreement
occurs. In this paper, performance analysis and improvements
for key generation exploiting imperfect channel statement in-
formation (CSI) is studied. Firstly, the closed-form expression
for key disagreement rate (KDR) is derived to evaluate the key
mismatch caused by time delay and estimation error. Secondly,
the energy efficiency involving power allocation between key
generation and private data transmission is presented. After
that, a neural network based prediction (NNBP) algorithm is
proposed to improve the key consistency. Simulation results verify
the theoretical analysis and show that NNBP achieves significant
improvements. And it’s interesting to find that NNBP algorithm
achieves a higher performance gain in low signal-to-noise ration
(SNR) and high delay condition, which is different from other
methods, like guard band based quantizer (GBBQ).
I. INTRODUCTION
As a promising alternative to traditional key cryptography,
key generation from wireless channel has attracted extensive
research interest in recent years [1]– [4]. The most difference
between wireless key generation and classic schemes is the
theoretical basis, i.e. inherent randomness of wireless chan-
nel versus computational complexity of hard mathematical
problems. Exploiting reciprocity of downlink and uplink, a
common secret key can be shared at the source and destination
[5] [6]. Considering that the eavesdropper’s channel is inde-
pendent, it can derive non information about the secret key.
Moreover, as the wireless channel keeps changing dynamically
and randomly, such secret key can be updated continuously, i.e.
the so-called “one-time pad” can be realized. Also, this scheme
doesn’t rely on any infrastructure to manage key distribution
because key is generated locally without participation of a
third party, which reduces the risk of leakage.
Typically, the procedure of wireless key generation can
be divided into four stages: channel estimation, quantization,
information reconciliation, and privacy amplification [7]. In
the first stage, the source and the destination alternatively
measure the common channel and then store the randomness
as source of key generation. In Stage 2, the stored randomness
is quantized into two raw key sequences, respectively. Ideally,
they are identical because channel reciprocity guarantees that.
However, due to unavoidable factors in practice, e.g. stochastic
noise, estimation errors and non-simultaneous measurements,
discrepancy exists between the channel state information (CSI)
obtained at two parties, and thus key disagreement may occur.
As such, Stage 3, i.e. information reconciliation is performed
while two key sequences don’t pass the consistency check.
Yet, some interaction information, not the key itself, would
be revealed to eavesdropper at the same time. So, the final
stage, privacy amplification is then adopted to eliminate the
effect of information reveal. Observing this whole procedure,
it can be deduced that if key disagreement rate (KDR) is low
enough after Stage 2, then interaction in Stage 3 will be greatly
reduced. Correspondingly, kinds of preprocessing algorithms
and improved quantizers are proposed. For example, wavelet
analysis and linear prediction are used to improve the cross-
correlation of channel measurements in [8]– [9], respectively.
And entropy-constrained-like quantizer and guard band based
quantizer (GBBQ) are proposed in [10] and [11], respectively.
However, a common drawback of these works is lack
of theoretical analysis to provide an insight into the key
generation performance. In [12], an approximation for KDR
is obtained based on Gauss-Laguerre quadrature. Nonetheless,
this result is not closed-form, and only the impact of estimation
error is taken into account, without that of time delay. On the
other hand, owing to light-weight computation, key generation
has great potential in energy-constrained applications [2] [3].
But few works focus on the energy efficiency (EE) problem
involving power allocation between key generation and data
transmission. Moreover, reducing KDR can also help save
energy consumption for making it easier to generate consistent
key of required length.
Therefore, the motivation of this paper lies in: 1) To derive
the closed-form expression for KDR. 2) To evaluate the energy
efficiency. 3) To design a scheme that improves key consis-
tency more. Specifically, we at first present the correlation
model of channel observations with time delay and estimation
error. Then, the exact closed-form expression for KDR and
EE is derived for the first time, by using a series expansion
of Marcum Q function. To further mitigate discrepancy and
decrease KDR, a neural network based prediction (NNBP)
algorithm is proposed. Taking samples at one side as input
and that of the other side as output, the neural network can be
trained to capture the inherent correlation between samples
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at two sides and then predict each other’s estimated CSI.
At last, numerical results are presented and they verify the
effectiveness of our work. And a very interesting finding is
that, the worse the channel estimation condition is, i.e. a
lower signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of pilot symbol and a higher
delay, the higher performance gain can be benefited from the
proposed NNBP algorithm. This is totally different from what
happens in GBBQ.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As depicted in Fig. 1, the key generation for a wearable
device communication is considered. The system consists of
an access point (AP) Alice (a), a wearable device Bob (b),
and a passive eavesdropper Eve (e). Bob intends to report the
private sensor data to Alice, wherein key generated from the
common wireless channel is used for encryption.
The distance between Alice and Bob is denoted by d and the
path loss exponent is l. The Rayleigh fading channel between
Alice and Bob at time t is denoted by hab(t) ∼ CN(0, σ2h),
in which σ2h = d
−l. The Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN) at each node is denoted by ni(t) ∼ CN(0, σ2n),
i ∈ {a, b}. In this paper, the amplitude of hab(t), i.e. |hab(t)|,
is exploited as the common random source to generate secret
key Ka and Kb at Alice and Bob, respectively. Some assump-
tions should be clarified so justify the secrecy of key generated
from this model. Firstly, the eavesdropper is assumed to be at
least half the wavelength away from Alice and Bob so that
the channel observations at Eve, i.e. hae(t) and hbe(t) are
uncorrelated to hab(t). Actually, if Eve is too close to Bob,
it can be detected easily. Secondly, this is a typical mobile
communications channel, where multi-path fading plays a
much more important role in random variation than large scale
fading does. So, even the position and movement of Bob is
observed, Eve still can’t derive any information about hab(t).
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Key Disagreement Rate
A least squares (LS) channel estimator [13] is used, with
transmitting power of pilot symbols denoted by Ppilot. Con-
sidering time delay τ , channels estimated by Alice and Bob
can be written as
hˆa (t) = hab (t) + na (t)
hˆb (t+ τ) = hab (t+ τ) + nb (t+ τ)
(1)
where na (t) and nb (t+ τ) are estimation error terms fol-
lowing complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean and
variance σ2na = σ
2
nb
=
σ2n
Ppilot
[13], and they are independent
from hab(t) and hab(t + τ), respectively. Meanwhile, the
variance of hˆa (t) can be given by σ2hˆ = σ
2
h +
σ2n
Ppilot
. Denote
γpilot =
Ppilot
σ2n
as the transmitting SNR of pilot symbols. It
is obvious that estimation error terms become small as γpilot
increases to a high level.
According to the Jakes model, the following relationship
can be obtained
hab (t+ τ) = ρdhab (t) + nd (t+ τ) (2)
 ab th
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Fig. 1. System model.
where nd(t + τ), with zero mean and variance σ2d =(
1− ρd2
)
σ2h, is the equivalent error term resulted from time
delay and is uncorrelated with hab(t). The correlation co-
efficient takes the value ρd = J0 (2pifmaxτ), where J0 (·)
is the zeroth order Bessel function of the first kind, and
fmax is the maximum Doppler shift. Assume that the relative
movement speed, the carrier frequency and the velocity of
light are denoted by v, f0 and c, respectively, then fmax can
be determined by fmax = vf0/c.
Substituting Eq.(2) into Eq.(1), we have
hˆb (t+τ) =ρhˆa (t) + ne (t+ τ) (3)
in which
ρ = ρd
γpilotσ
2
h
γpilotσ2h + 1
(4)
is the correlation coefficient between hˆa(t) and hˆb(t + τ),
while ne (t+ τ) is a equivalent complex Gaussian random
variable with zero mean and variance σ2e =
(
1− ρ2)σ2
hˆ
.
Denoting ρe =
γpilotσ
2
h
γpilotσ2h+1
, then ρ can be rewritten as ρ = ρdρe.
Obviously, ρe is the correlation coefficient between hˆa(t) and
hˆb(t), while
√
ρe is the correlation coefficient between hi(t)
and hˆi(t), where i ∈ {a, b}.
Without loss of generality, one-bit GBBQ is adopted to
generate raw key sequences Ka and Kb. Denoting ga (t) =∣∣∣hˆa (t)∣∣∣ and gb (t) = ∣∣∣hˆb (t+τ)∣∣∣, then both ga (t) and gb (t) are
Rayleigh variables, with the expectation and standard deviation
written as µg = σhˆ
√
pi
2 and σg =
√
2− pi2σhˆ, respectively.
The quantizer can be described as
Ki =
 1 gi (t) ≥ γU0 gi (t) < γL
none γL ≤ gi (t) < γU
(5)
in which i ∈ {a, b}, γU = µg + ∆σg is the upper threshold,
γL = µg − ∆σg is the lower threshold, and ∆ is used to
control the size of guard band. To make sure that γL > 0, the
upper bound of ∆ is determined as
∆ <
µg
σg
=
√
pi
4− pi (6)
While gi (t) falls into the interval [γL, γU ), it should be
discarded from quantization. Specially, if we set ∆ = 0, two
thresholds become one and the guard band vanishes.
Straightly, the following three events can be defined to
describe the quantization results, i.e.
Event 1: ga(t) and gb(t) are quantized to the same bit.
Event 2: ga(t) and gb(t) are quantized to different bits.
Event 3: either ga(t) or gb(t) falls into the interval [γL, γU ).
It should be noted that only samples making Event 1 or
Event 2 happen are effective. If Event 3 occurs, both ga(t)
and gb(t) should be discarded from quantization to make sure
that Ka and Kb are of the same length. This can be realized
by exchanging indexes of ineffective samples between Alice
and Bob, without compromising secrecy. Probabilities can be
obtained as following P1 =Pr (ga < γL, gb < γL)+Pr (ga ≥ γU , gb ≥ γU )P2 =Pr (ga ≥ γU , gb < γL) + Pr (ga < γL, gb ≥ γU )
P3 =2 Pr (γL≤ga<γU )−Pr (γL≤ga<γU , γL≤gb<γU )
(7)
in which P3 can also be calculated as P3 = 1 − P1 − P2. It
can be easily concluded that P1 is the probability of generating
one identical key bit at Alice and Bob using one sample, while
P1 + P2 can be viewed as the effective samples ratio (ESR)
over all samples.
Now that only effective samples are exploited for key
generation, the exact closed-form expression for KDR in the
raw bit sequence can be derived as
PKD = P2/ (P1 + P2) (8)
Actually, if PKD is under certain threshold, the error bits can
be corrected via information reconciliation, which means that
the whole raw key sequence can be exploited. So both high
ESR and low PKD are desired. However, if the size of guard
band is enlarged by increasing the value of ∆, both ESR and
PKD will decreases simultaneously, and vice versa.
For given ga (t) = α, gb (t) is a Ricean random variable
with parameter
(
ρα, σ2e
)
, and the conditional probability den-
sity function (PDF) is written as
fgb(t)|ga(t)=α (β) =
2βe
− β2+ρd2ρe2α2
(1−ρd2ρe2)σ2hˆ
(1−ρd2ρe2)σ2hˆ
I0
(
2ρdρeαβ
(1−ρd2ρe2)σ2hˆ
)
(9)
Since ga follows a Rayleigh distribution with parameter σhˆ,
the joint PDF of ga and gb can be derived as
fga,gb (α, β) =
4αβe
− α2+β2
(1−ρd2ρe2)σ2hˆ
(1− ρd2ρe2)σ4hˆ
I0
(
2ρdρeαβ
(1− ρd2ρe2)σ2hˆ
)
(10)
which shows that fga,gb (α, β) = fgb,ga (α, β). So, we have
P2 =2 Pr (ga ≥ γU , gb < γL) = 2 Pr (ga<γL, gb ≥ γU ) .
(11)
Correspondingly, P2 can be calculated as
P2 = 2
∫ γL
0
fga(t) (α)
∫∞
γU
fgb(t)|ga(t)=α (β) dβdα
= 4
σ2
hˆ
∫ γL
0
αe
−α2
σ2
hˆQ1
(√
2ρα
σe
,
√
2γU
σe
)
dα
(12)
where Q1( ) is the Marcum Q function. Referring to Eq.(29)
in [14] and performing some change of variables, we have
Q1
(√
2ρα
σe
,
√
2γU
σe
)
= e
− ρ2α2
σ2e
∞∑
k=0
ρ2kΓ
(
k + 1, γU
2
σ2e
)
σ2ke Γ (k + 1)
2 α
2k
(13)
According to Eq.(3.381.8) in [15], Eq.(12) can be rewritten as
P2=2
(
1− ρ2) ∞∑
k=0
ρ2kΓ
(
k + 1, γU
2
σ2e
)
Γ (k + 1)
2 Υ
(
k + 1,
γL
2
σe2
)
(14)
in which Γ (x) is the gamma function, Γ (x, y) is the upper
incomplete gamma function and Υ (x, y) is the lower incom-
plete gamma function.
Similarly, P1 can be obtained as
P1 = 1−e
− γL2
σ2
hˆ −(1−ρ2) ∞∑
k=0
ρ2kΓ
(
k+1,
γL
2
σ2e
)
Γ(k+1)2
Υ
(
k+1, γL
2
σe2
)
+
(
1− ρ2) ∞∑
k=0
ρ2kΓ
(
k+1,
γU
2
σ2e
)2
Γ(k+1)2
(15)
Substituting (14) and (15) into (8), the exact closed-from
expression for KDR can be finally derived.
B. Energy Efficiency
Now, let’s consider the energy efficiency for Bob. Assume
that the total power at Bob is P , and there are N bits data to be
reported, at a fixed rate R0. To deliver these date securely and
successfully, one part of Bob’s power should be allocated for
generating N bits secret key, while the other part for reliable
data transmission.
Recalling that the power consumed in channel estimation is
Ppilot, the power remains for data transmission is then Pdata =
P − Ppilot. Denoting that a = Ppilot/P , in which 0 < a < 1,
we have Pdata = (1 − a)P . As P1 stands for the expected
number of key bits obtained from one sample, the average
number of samples required for generating N key bits is
Ns =
N
P1
(16)
Accordingly, the energy cost is
Ek =
N
P1
Ppilotτ0 =
N
P1
τ0aP (17)
in which τ0 is the time used for transmitting pilot symbols, and
Ppilotτ0 is the energy cost for each one sample. Obviously, it
holds that τ ≥ τ0 for time delay in channel estimation between
Alice and Bob.
On the other hand, the energy consumed for data transmit-
ting is obtained as
Ed =
N
R0
Pdata =
N
R0
(1− a)P (18)
The total energy cost can be derived as
E = Ek + Ed = NP
(R0τ0 − P1) a+P1
P1R0
(19)
in which only Bob’s energy consumption in channel estimation
and data transmission are counted here. Because the major
concern is power allocation between them, other energy cost
is omitted.
The throughput of Bob in reporting can be determined as
Rt=R0 (1− Pout) (20)
in which the outage probability is
Pout = 1− exp
(
−
(
2R0 − 1)σ2n
(1− a)Pσ2h
)
(21)
Finally, the energy efficiency can be derived as
EE =
Rt
E
=
P1R0
2 exp
(
− (2
R0−1)σ2n
(1−a)Pσ2h
)
NP [(R0τ0 − P1) a+P1] (22)
Obviously, it can be seen that the value of a has a strong
impacts on energy efficiency EE. But more interestingly,
it can also be observed that the optimized choice of a is
influenced by the data transmitting rate R0, which can be
specified as following.
As R0 increases: From the perspective of the numerator
part, R20 increases along with a degrade in the exponential
function. In this condition, we should choose a small a to
maintain the reliability of data transmission. While observing
the denominator part, it holds that R0τ0 > P1 as R0 increases,
so also a lower a is favorable.
As R0 decreases: In this case, the reliability of data
transmission can be easily guaranteed with small power. As a
result, more power should be allocated for key generation to
increase P1. On the other hand, it holds that R0τ0 < P1 as
R0 increases, so we also should increase a to minimize the
denominator part.
IV. NEURAL NETWORK BASED PREDICTION ALGORITHM
Though discrepancy exists, channel estimation results at
Alice and Bob are still strongly correlated, which implies that
prediction is feasible after learning and training. So, in this
section, an NNBP algorithm is proposed, to decrease KDR
and improve P1.
As shown in Fig.2, a single hidden layer neural network is
considered. We assume that there are m input units, n hidden
units and 1 output unit. The inputs of input layer is denoted
by x = [x1x2...xm]. The weight associated with the connection
between input unit i and hidden unit j is denoted by uij , while
that between hidden unit j and output unit is denoted by vj .
The bias associated with unit j in hidden layer is denoted
by qj , while that associated with output unit is ω. Thus, the
input of the hidden layer can be calculated as a= x ∗U− q,
in which U ∈ <m×n is the weight matrix consisting of uij
while q is the bias vector consisting of qj . Assuming that
the sigmoid function, i.e. f (x) = 11+exp(−x) is chosen to be
the activation function, then the output of the hidden layer
is obtained as b=f (a). By the way, the sigmoid function
follows that f ′ (x) = f (x) (1− f (x)), which is useful while
computing gradient. Correspondingly, the input of the output
…
…
…
…
input layer
1x
 =y f 
hidden layer output layer
2x
mx
=x*U a q  =fb a
= * b v
-1
-1
ag
bg
- e
Fig. 2. Neural network model.
layer is represented by λ=b∗v − ω, where v ∈ <n×1 is the
weight vector consisting of vj . Similarly, the output of the
output layer is written as y=f (λ).
Using enough channel samples to train the neural network,
the parameters U, q, v and ω can be optimized so that Alice
can use local estimation to predict Bob’s. The algorithm takes
following steps.
Step 1: Alice and Bob normalize the amplitude of channel
samples, i.e. Gi = [gi(1) gi(2) ... gi(N)] (i ∈ {a, b}) as
gi(t) =
gi(t)−min (Gi)
max (Gi)−min (Gi) . (23)
After that, Bob sends Gb = [gb(1) gb(2) ... gb(N)] to Alice,
who will train the neural network by data set (Ga, Gb).
Step 2: Alice initializes the parameters U, q, v, ω as U(1),
q(1), v(1), ω(1), randomly between 0 and 1. The learning rate
is initialized by η = 0.1. Two error terms are set as E1 = 0
and E2 = 0. Alice divides Ga into
⌊
N
m
⌋
blocks. Each block is
of the length m. Assume that m is an odd number, e.g. m=5,
then it means that Alice intends to predict gb(3) based its own
knowledge [ga(1), ga(2), ..., ga(5)], etc.
Step 3: Perform i = 0, E1 = E2 and E2 = 0.
Step 4: Perform i = i+ 1. Input the ith block
x(i) = [ga ((i− 1)m+ 1) ga ((i− 1)m+ 2) ... ga(im)]
(24)
into the input layer, then the inputs and outputs of hidden layer
and output layer can be determined by
a(i)=x(i)∗U(i) − q(i)
b(i)=f
(
a(i)
)
λ(i)=b(i)∗v(i) − ω(i)
y(i)=f
(
λ(i)
) , (25)
respectively. The inverse-normalization of y(i) can be viewed
as the prediction of
gb
(
(i− 1)m+ m+ 1
2
)
=
∣∣∣∣ĥb((i− 1)m+ m+ 12 + τ
)∣∣∣∣ .
(26)
TABLE I
PARAMETERS SETTING
d(m) l P (dBm) N(bits) σ2n(dBm)
20 3.5 10 64 -60
∆ τ(ms) v(m/s) f0(Hz) c(m/s)
0, 0.1, 0.2 10 1 1.8G 3× 108
Step 5: Defining the cost function as
e(i) =
1
2
(
y(i) − gb
(
(i− 1)m+ m+ 1
2
))2
, (27)
i.e. the one-half squared error between Alice’s prediction and
Bob’s estimation. Iterations of gradient descent are explored to
update the parameters and decrease the cost function. Compute
the partial derivatives of the cost function respect to ω, v, q
and U in sequence as following
z
(i)
1 =
∂e(i)
∂ω(i)
=y(i)
(
1−y(i)) (gb((i− 1)m+m+12 )−y(i))
z
(i)
2 =
∂e(i)
∂v(i)
= −z1b(i)
z
(i)
3 =
∂e(i)
∂q(i)
= b(i)
(
1− b(i)) z(i)1 v(i)
z
(i)
4 =
∂e(i)
∂U(i)
= −b(i) (1− b(i)) z(i)1 v(i)x(i)
,
(28)
and update the sum of cost function as E2 = E2 + e(i).
Step 6: Update parameters with learning rate η, i.e.
ω(i+1) = ω(i) − η ∂e(i)
∂ω(i)
v(i+1) = v(i) − η ∂e(i)
∂v(i)
q(i+1) = q(i) − η ∂e(i)
∂q(i)
U(i+1)=U(i) − η ∂e(i)
∂U(i)
(29)
If i <
⌊
N
m
⌋
, go to Step 4. Otherwise, go to Step 7.
Step 7: Go back to Step 3 if |E2 − E1| > ε, in which
ε takes a small value denoting the maximal tolerable error.
Otherwise, the neural network training is finished. Go to Step
8.
Step 8: Alice and Bob estimate the channel alternatively
and obtain G(2)A and G
(2)
B , respectively. For Bob, key sequence
KB is generated by directly quantizing G
(2)
B . For Alice, G
(2)
A
should be normalized and then be input into the trained neural
network block by block. After inverse-normalizing the output,
prediction results based on G(2)A is obtained, from which key
sequence KA can be generated at Alice.
It should be emphasized that Bob sending CSI to Alice in
Step 1 is for the purpose of neural network training not for
quantization, and it will not compromise the secrecy of key
generated in Step 8. Firstly, wireless channel always changes.
The CSI exploited to generate key is measured in Step 8,
independent from that in Step 1. Secondly, though Eve may
be intelligent enough to train a neural network based on Bob’s
CSI transmitted in Step 1, it still can’t predict legitimate users’
CSI in Step 8, because two channel are uncorrelated.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The parameter setting is presented in Table I. Simulations
are performed for 100000 times. We assume that the proposed
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Fig. 3. Key disagreement ratio versus transmitting SNR of pilot symbols.
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NNBP algorithm is operated at Alice for Alice is more
capable.
The KDR versus γpilot is illustrated in Fig. 3. As expected,
when the transmitting SNR of pilot symbols increases, channel
estimation becomes more precise, thus KDR decreases. Since
time delay would degrade the correlation between channel
estimations at Alice and Bob, so a rise in KDR appears as we
increase the value of τ . Moreover, it is interesting to find that
the performance gain obtained from enlarging ∆ is sensitive
to the condition of channel estimation, i.e. GBBQ is more
effective in high SNR regime and low time delay case.
In Fig. 4, the energy efficiency versus a = Ppilot/P is
presented. It can be observed that how EE varies as changing
a is correlated to the value of R0. When a small transmitting
rate is used, e.g. R0 = 1, 2, EE increases monotonically as
a increases. The reason is that the outage probability keeps
very low since R0 is quite small, so more power should be
allocated for channel estimation to generate the key, and vice
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
γpilot(dB)
M
SE
without prediction
NNBP
τ=0
τ=10ms
τ=20ms
Fig. 5. MSE versus transmitting SNR of pilot symbols.
versa. However, when R0 takes a medium value, an optimal
value of a exists to maximize EE.
In Fig. 5, the mean square error (MSE) between Alice’s
and Bob’s channel observation versus γpilot is depicted. Since
the proposed NNBP algorithm enables Alice to acquire more
precise information about Bob’s estimation, a reduction in
MSE is observed. Interestingly, it shows that Alice benefits
more from NNBP in lower SNR and higher delay condition,
i.e. the superiority provided by NNBP gradually vanishes
while the channel estimation becomes perfect, because there
is little room for improvement in this case.
In Fig. 6, both ESR and KDR are presented versus the
change of ∆ while γpilot=14 dB. Though enlarging the size of
guard band can help to reduce KDR, ESR is also decreased at
the same time, which means a reduction in the length of raw
key sequence. As observed, this reduction can be more than
50%. However, if we combine NNBP with GBBQ, a higher
ESR along with a lower KDR together can be achieved at the
same time.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, key generation from imperfect CSI is in-
vestigated. Firstly, we derive the closed-form expression for
KDR while both time delay and estimation error are taken
into account. After that, the energy efficiency with power
allocation between channel estimation and data transmission is
evaluated. Then, we propose a neural network based algorithm
for channel prediction based on local estimation so that a lower
KDR can be achieved. A lower KDR means less interaction
for reconciliation, thus the risk of information revealing is
reduced.
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